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KEEP THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS COMING:
THE EFFECTS OF

J.E.M. AG SUPPLY, INCORPORATED V.
PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED
ON UNIVERSITIES' USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWS TO PROTECT THEIR PLANT GENETIC
RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

Some universities and professors invest scarce resources in
researching plant genetics. These universities and professors
need to be aware of patent laws to protect their investments
and resulting discoveries, as well as to avoid infringing on
others' patents. 1 Further, being well-versed in the law will
allow universities to better understand their options when they
negotiate licensing and settlement agreements.
Intellectual property (IP) in the plant genetic field has
become an important issue-not just to universities-but to
governments, farmers, and corporations around the world.
There are at least two reasons for this. First, we are globally
interconnected more than ever before and overseas markets are
1. Goldie Blumenstyk, U. of Rochester Risks Millions in Patent Fight with
Pharmaceutical Giants, Chron. of Higher Educ. (Sept. 20, 2002) (for example, a
University of Rochester professor, Dr. Young, filed his first patent in 1992 and is now
engaged in a high-stakes infringement suit. "Dr. Young says he didn't quite appreciate
how complicated and contentious the process could be. For a brief moment, in fact, he
even considered not using a lawyer at all. 'I thought it was so easy that maybe I should
do it myself-that you wrote to the patent office and they sent you a form,' he recalls.").
See rtenerally Goldie Blumenstyk, Universities Try to Keep Inventions From Going 'Out
the Back Door': To Keep Hold of Lucrative Licenses, Institutions Educate, Cajole, and
Sometimes Sue, Chron. of Higher Educ. (May 17, 2002) ("[P]rofessors may not realize
that the university might also claim inventions developed during consulting, if the
invention overlaps with their university work." Further, universities certainly have a
financial incentive to educate their researchers and track university research projects
to prevent researchers from "going over the wall" or going "out the back door" to patent
and license their inventions.); U. of W.Va. Bd. of Trustees v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d
1288 (W.Va. 2002).
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important to United States corporations. Second, plant genetic
research is advancing rapidly; thus, we are compelled to
promptly enact laws to govern new biotechnologies such as
plant gene transfer.
New biotechnologies lead to cases of first impression arising
in the court system. In 2001, the United States Supreme Court
decided J.E.M. Ag Supply, Incorporated v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Incorporated (J.E.M.). 2 Clarifying an important
question, the Court held that plant varieties may be patented
under the utility patent statute 3 and that the Plant Patent Act 4
(PP A) and Plant Variety Protection Act 5 (PVP A) are not the
sole means of patenting plant varieties. 6 The Court's holding
clarified an ambiguity that affected both universities and
corporations that engage in plant breeding and plant genetic
research.
This comment will first provide a general overview of the
three means by which plant-inventions can be protected: the
general utility patent, the PPA, and the PVP A The comment
will then discuss what factors affected the outcome of the
J.E.M. case and conclude with a discussion of the importance of
plant-related patents to United States universities.
The
primary question this comment addresses is what impact will
the J.E.M. case have on universities involved in plant genetic
research? As will be discussed, universities are finding a new
source of revenue as well as a new source of liability in the
proliferation of intellectual property from plant genetic
research.
I. THREE TYPES OF IP PROTECTION FOR PLANTS

Patent law is meant to provide incentive for people and
companies to invest in research and product development. 7
2. 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (hereinafter, the parties are abbreviated in the text as
"J.E.M." and "Pioneer").
3. 35 U .S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000).
4. 35 U .S.C.§ 161 et seq. (2000).
5. 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (2000).
6. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 145.
7. "The patent laws promote this progress [of science] by offering inventors
exclusive rights [i.e., a monopoly] for a limited period as an incentive for their
inventiveness and research efforts." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980)
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. u. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-481 (1974); Universal Oil
Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)).
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The J.E.M. case affirmed the lower court's holding that plants
are patentable subject matter under the utility patent statute
as well as the PPA and the PVPA. This section briefly
compares and contrasts these three IP schemes. 8

A. General Utility Patents
The Constitution gives Congress power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 9
Building on the
Constitutional language, Thomas Jefferson authored the
Patent Act of 1793. 10 Jefferson's language laid the foundation
for what has become Title 35 of the United States Code section
101, which provides for the issuance of utility patents. The
statute states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 11
The utility patent applicant must provide a "specification" 12
that contains a "clear" and "concise" written description of the
invention sufficiently detailed "as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same." 13
In addition, the specification "shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 14
To obtain a utility patent, the applicant must show that the
plant is "new, useful, and nonobvious." 15 If the applicant seeks
a utility patent for a plant, he or she must include a reasonable
8. For more in-depth coverage of these three schemes, see generally Elisa Rives,
Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants and Progeny
Patentable under the Utility Patent Act of 1952, 32 Cumb. L. Rev. I87 (200I-2002).
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. For a more developed history of laws and cases
affecting the patentability of plants, see Nancy J. Linck, Patentable Subject Matter
Under Section 101-Are Plants Included?, 67 J. of the Pat. & Trademark Off. Socy. 489,
489-496 (Sept. I985).
10. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). See Act of Feb. 21, I793, §I, I Stat. 3I9 (Jefferson
authored the Patent Act of I793 in which he defined § 10 I subject matter as "any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful
improvement [thereof]") (quoted in Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308).
12. a5 U .S.C. § 1ll(a)(2)(A) (2000).
13. 35 U .S.C. § 112 (2000).
14. ld.
15 . •J.E.M., 5a4 U.S. at 142 (citing a5 U.S.C. §§ 101-103).
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plant description, which generally means that the applicant
must submit a deposit of the biological material, e.g., seeds,
plant tissue cells, etc., in a designated repository where the
material will be publicly available.l 6 These requirements
exceed those found in the PPA or the PVP A.
Utility patents provide broad rights to the patent holder,
including the right to file multiple claims 17 and the right to
prevent others from making or even using the invention 18
during a twenty-year term. 19 In patent infringement cases, the
utility patent allows the patent holder to receive "damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by
the court." 20
Compared to alternative patenting schemes, the utility
patent requires more applicant input (e.g., detailed written
description of the invention), but it also provides heightened
protections. Seed companies like Pioneer rely on the utility
patent's protection against saving seed. For example, if seed is
patented and licensed under the utility patent, the purchasing
farmer may not save seed for reuse on the farm the next year. 21
Rather, in most cases, the farmer must buy more seed each
year.

16. ld. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 (2001) (regarding disclosure by persons
seeking to patent biological material under the utility patent statute).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.").
18. The utility patent includes:
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, ... the right to exclude
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or
importing into the United States, products made by that process.
:35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l) (original language adopted in Act of April 10, 1790) (italics
added).
19. 35 U .S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
20. 35 U .S.C. § 284 (2000).
21. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (2002) (Monsanto sued
McFarling, a farmer, for patent infringement of Roundup Ready soybeans. The license
agreement prohibited the farmer from saving seed for replanting. Citing .J.E.M., the
court held that "the right to save seed of plants registered under the PVPA docs not
impart the right to save seed of plants patented under the !general utility] Patent
Act.").
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The utility patent is the most expensive form of protection;
however, the protection is broader than PPA protection because
the utility patent applies to "anything under the sun that is
made by man" 22 while the PPA and PVP A apply only to certain
new plant varieties. 23

B. Plant Patent Act
In 1930, Congress passed the PPA, which specified that
asexually-reproduced plants are proper subject matter covered
by section 101 (the utility patent statute). 24 In 1952, the PPA
provisions were moved to section 161 et seq. 25 Under the PPA,
the patent holder has the right to exclude others from
asexually reproducing the plant, and from using, offering for
sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any of its parts,
throughout the United States, or from importing the plant so
reproduced, or any parts thereof, into the United States. 26
The PPA protects only plants reproduced by vegetative
propagation (i.e., asexual reproduction), including cuttings,
budding, and grafting_27
This category "include[s] many
ornamental plants for landscaping, certain vegetable and fruit
species and certain [turfgrasses]." 28
To protect against

22. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Sen. Rep. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R.
Rpt. 82-1923, at 6 (1952) (statement made by P.J. Frederico, a principle draftsman of
the 1952 Act, Hearings on HR. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1951) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 60 F.
618, 620 (W.D.Pa. 1894)))). See generally Linck, supra n. 9, at 493.
2:3. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2002) ("Whoever invents or discovers and asexually
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant ... may obtain a patent therefore ... ")
(italics added). See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000) (PVPA provision).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2002) (provides: "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including ... hybrids ... , may obtain
a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
25. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 1:33.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000).
27. Web Garden, Ohio Master Gardener Program, Ohio St. U. Extension,
<http://www.hcs.ohio-state.edu/mg/manuallprop2.htm> (accessed Dec. 26, 2002); see
Rives, supra n. 8, at 199 ("The PPA provides the plant breeder patent protection to a
single claimed plant with a unique characteristic, either physiological or anatomical,
that can be cloned by grafts, buds, or cuttings, resulting in a new plant with the same
characteristic.") (citing Andrew F. Nilles, Plant Patent Law: The Federal Circuit Sows
the Seeds to Allow Agriculture to Grow, 35 Land & Water L. Rev. :355, 861 (2000)).
28. E-mail from Robert R. Fincher, Dir., Tech. Commercialization Off., U. of Ga.,
to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 22, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels).
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infringement, the PPA was amended in 1998 to include "plant
parts." 29
Generally, applicants for section 161 plant patents must
meet the same requirements as section 101 applicants. 30
Diverting from the utility patent provisions, however, PP A
grants are limited to one claim only, 31 and the PPA description
need only be "as complete as is reasonably possible." 32

C. Plant Variety Protection Act
In 1970, Congress passed the PVPA, which generally
provided that developers of sexually reproduced plant variety
could obtain a PVP certificate through the Plant Variety
Protection Office. 33 The applicant must show that the plant
variety is new, distinct, uniform, and genetically stable. 34
Further, the applicant must deposit some of the protected seed
in a public depository, though "neither the [PVPA] statute
[Title 7 of the United States Code section 2422(4)] nor the
applicable regulation mandates that such material be
accessible to the general public during the term of the PVP
certificate." 35 PVP A protection "is designed for particular types
of plants that require the ability to sexually reproduce [via
pollen, seeds, etc.] on a large scale in order to be commercially
valuable." 36
29. Pub. L. 105-289, § 2, 112 Stat. 2780 (Oct. 27, 1998) (provided that: "(a)
Findings. - The Congress makes the following findings: ... (3) Plant parts produced
from plants protected by United States plant patents are being taken from illegally
reproduced plants and traded in United States markets to the detriment of plant
patent holders. (4) Resulting lost royalty income inhibits investment in domestic
research and breeding activities associated with a wide variety of crops. . . . Such
research is the foundation of a strong horticultural industry. (5) Infringers producing
such plant parts from unauthorized plants enjoy an unfair competitive advantage over
producers who pay royalties on varieties protected by United States plant patents.")
30. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000) ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for
inventions shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided."). See
J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 133 ("To obtain a plant patent under§ 161 a breeder must meet all
of the requirements for§ 101, except for the description requirement.").
31. Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1564 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Only a single claim is permitted in a plant patent." (citing 37 C.F.R. § L 164; Manual
o(Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1605 (Rev. 14, Nov. 1992))).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000).
33. 7 U.S. C.§ 2402 (2000).
34. 7 U.S. C.§ 2402 (2000).
35. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 143; see 7 C.F.R. 97.6 (2001).
36. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 4-5, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 200 I) (available at
2001 WL 1196195).
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The primary provisions of the PVP A are as follows: The
PVP A prohibits marketing a protected variety but allows
breeding (making crosses) with the protected variety. 37 Though
the PVP holder can prevent others from selling the protected
seed and thus stop commerce, she cannot stop people from
using the protected seed to make other hybrids. 38 The PVPA
protects not only the specific protected variety but also
essentially derived varieties. 39 The PPA and utility patent
statute do not exempt saving seed for use on the farm. 40 Under
the PVPA, however, a farmer may "raise a crop one year [and]
save seed to use for himself the next year." 41 The PVPA also
includes an exemption for research. 42
37. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (2000) (the PVPA states that without express permission,
no one may: "(1) sell or market the protected variety, or offer it or expose it for sale,
deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer to buy it, or any other
transfer of title or possession of it; (2) import the variety into, or export it from, the
United States; (3) sexually multiply, or propagate by a tuber ... , the variety as a step
in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; (4) use the variety in producing (as
distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.")
38. E-mail from Robert R. Fincher, Dir., Tech. Commercialization Off., U. of Ga.,
to Timothy P. Daniels (Dec. 16, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels) (Dr. Robert
Fincher notes, "[U]niversities primarily rely on Plant Patents and PVP [certificates] for
protecting their plants. I don't believe many universities are filing utility patents on
plants unless the plant claim is part of a set of claims to a transgenic modification of
plants.").
39. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(c)(l) (2000) ("[a]n essentially derived variety (EDV) is a
variety that is (1) 'predominantly derived from another [initially protected] variety,' (2)
'clearly distinguishable from the initial [protected] variety,' and (3) except for
differences that result from the act of derivation, conforms to the initial variety in the
expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination
of genotypes of the initial variety except for differences that result from the act of
derivation, conforms to the initial variety in the expression of the essential
characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial
[protected] variety."); 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(3) (2000).
40. Telephone Interview with RichardS. Cahoon, Cornell U. Pat. & Tech. Mktg.
(Nov. 5, 2002).
41. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 5, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (2001 WL
1196195) (Original statement was a question.). See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2002).
Saving seed has a long and significant history. Inbreeding crops such as wheat
or soybeans pollinate themselves; genetically, the seed of inbreeding crops produces an
exact clone of the parent plant, commonly called "true-to-type" reproduction. Before
seeds were patented under section 101, farmers purchased non-patented seed from a
breeder such as Pioneer. After growing the crops, the farmer would save some seed
("bin-run seed") for replanting the next season and sell the rest on the market. As long
as the farmer could legally save seed, he did not need to return to the breeder and buy
more.
On the other hand, hybrid-seed crops, such as corn, do not reproduce true-totype. Rather, there is genetic variation in the "F2" generation. If the farmer tried to
save and replant seed produced by hybrid "Fl" plants, he would end up with a non-
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Compared to the utility patent statute, the PVP A provides
very low-level protection. In fact, the PVPA system has been
described as being "almost a registration system ... [in which]
you fill out a form, and it's granted without any kind of a
rigorous examination as utility patents undergo in the United
States." 43 Due to recent advances in biotechnology, the PPA
and PVPA are often deemed insufficient protection because
they protect plant varieties from being marketed by
unauthorized parties but they do not protect unauthorized
parties from using the genes in those varieties in the
development of new varieties. 44 One practitioner noted that
"any plant-related gene patent, seed component patent,
transformation patent or plant improvement patent would not
qualify for PVP [protection] and therefore require a patent or
trade secret status for effective protection." 45 Researchers
sometimes seek to patent a process or plant trait-not a
variety-so the PPA and PVPA would be unsuitable means of
protection. In passing the PVP A, Congress intended "to afford
adequate encouragement for research and for marketing when
appropriate, to yield for the public the benefits of new
varieties." 46
Since patents can be costly, researchers must do a costbenefit analysis when deciding what level of IP protection to
uniform crop. Interview with Jeff Maughan, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci.,
B.Y.U. (Dec. 3, 2002). "Thus, a farmer who wishes to continue growing hybrid plants
generally needs to buy more hybrid seed." J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 128.
42. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000) ("The use and reproduction of a protected variety for
plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the
protection provided under this chapter.").
43. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 26, ,J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. :l, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195).
44. Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Property Law Assn. in Support of
Respt. Supporting Affirmance at 4, J.E.M., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL
649829) ("Today, the scope of subject matter relating to plants that can meet the
requirements of section 112 far exceeds single plant varieties, as defined by either the
PPA or the PVPA. In contrast, the protection afforded by plant patents and PVPA
certificates extends only to plant 'varieties."').
45. E-mail from John Grace, Germplasm Licensing Coord., Pioneer Hi-Bred Inti.,
Inc., to Timothy P. Daniels (Jan. 7, 2003) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels).
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (2000) ("Constitutional clauses 3 and 8 of article I, section 8
are both relied upon."); see Janice M. Strachan, Plant Variety Protection: An Alternative
to Patents, <http://warp .nal. usda.gov/pgdic/Probe/v2n2/p lant.ht m I> (accessed Nov. 16,
2002) (Janice M. Strachan, a Senior Examiner at the Plant Variety Protection Office,
suggests that the intent of the PVPA was to "'encourage the development of novel
varieties of sexually reproduced plants' by providing their owners with exclusive
marketing rights of them in the United States.").
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seek, if any. Utility patents generally cost between $10,000
and $20,000. Thus, universities tend to use the utility patent
only when they want to protect a very valuable discovery.
Plant patents generally cost between $5,000 and $10,000. 47
PVP certificates cost approximately $3,000, including fees for
the application, examination, and certificate. 48 For universities
that have tight budgets and little confidence in the commercial
value of a new plant variety, the PVPA provides an economical
level of IP protection. 4 9

II.

OVERVIEW OF J.E.M. AG SUPPLY, INCORPORATED V. PIONEER

HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED

The issues involved in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Incorporated v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Incorporated have been brewing
for decades. Before 1930, plant breeders' patent applications
were rejected by the United States Patent & Trademark Office
(USPTO) for two reasons: (1) The applications lacked a
sufficient written description of the plant to be patented, and
(2) plants were considered "product[s] of nature," 50 even though
humans clearly interfered with nature in the breeding process.
In 1930, Congress passed the PPA "to get over the two
historical hurdles of section 112, [the] written description
requirement and the so-called product of nature doctrine." 51
In 1980, the Court decided Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 52 The
issue in Chakrabarty was whether a human-engineered
bacterium could receive utility patent protection.
The
particular bacterium in question was commercially valuable
because it was "capable of breaking down multiple components
of crude oil"-a property "which [was] possessed by no
47. Cahoon, supra n. 40.
48. Plant
Variety
Protection
Off.,
General
Information,
<http://www.ams. usda.gov/science/pvpo/pvp.htm#What is the total cost of protection?>
(accessed Nov. 9, 2002).
49. E-mail from Jeff Maughan, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., B.Y.U.
(former corporate researcher), to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 20, 2002) (copy on file with
Mr. Daniels) (compared to holding a utility patent, "holding only a PVP certificate or
PPA patent may be construed as a weaker negotiating stance-but it nonetheless
provides the necessary legal protection that mandates that both parties come to an
amicable licensing/royalty agreement prior to commercialization of the product.").
50. d.F..M., 5:34 U.S. at 134 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311-312).
51. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 28, d.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195).
52. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
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naturally occurring bacteria." 53 Here, the Court held that
living things were patentable under section 101 if they were of
human derivation. 54
J.E.M. presented a different question-whether the PPA
and PVPA preempted section 101 in relation to protecting
plants, and thus made general utility patents unavailable to
new plant varieties. 55 In 2001, the United States Supreme
Court decided the J.E.M. case and held that "newly developed
plant breeds fall within the terms of section 101, and that
neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of section 101's
coverage." 56
After presenting the essential facts of the J.E.M. case, this
section will consider the holding, some issues raised in the
case, the Court's analysis, and some implications of the
holding.

A. The Facts of the J.E.M. Case
Although the J.E.M. case involved two private businesses,
the holding has implications for universities that engage in
plant genetic research. The primary facts from the case are as
follows: Pioneer is a major player in the United States seed
corn market, holding about forty percent of the annual $5
billion market.57 J.E.M. is an agricultural supply company.
Pioneer held seventeen utility patents protecting its inbred
and hybrid corn seed products. 58 J.E.M. purchased from
Pioneer hybrid corn patented by Pioneer. Pioneer sold its corn
under a limited license agreement, which prohibited the
licensee from reselling the corn. J.E.M. resold the licensed
seed and Pioneer sued for patent infringement.
The particular seed that was resold by J.E.M. was protected
by both a utility patent and a PVP certificate. Pioneer,
53. Id. at 305.
i14. ld. at i313 ("[T]he relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions.").
55. See ,J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 127.
56. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 145.
57. Mike Godwin & Victoria Slind-Flor, "Patent Plums," The Year in IP, Almanac
2001, IP Worldwide 66, 70 (Oct. 2001) (according to Victoria Slind-Fior, "[p]atent owner
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., a subsidiary of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company, maintains about a 40 percent share of the $5 billion annual market for seed
corn in the United States.").
58 . •J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 127.
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however, only sued for infringement of the utility patent,
presumably because J.E.M. did not violate Pioneer's rights
under the PVPA.59
J.E.M. counterclaimed, arguing that Pioneer's utility patent
was invalid because the PPA and PVPA were the "exclusive
statutory means for the protection of plant life because these
statutes are more specific than section 101, and thus each
carves out subject matter from section 101 for special
treatment." 60
B. The Holding of the J.E.M. Case
The Court held that Congress did not intend to remove
plants from section 101 coverage and that "neither the PPA nor
the PVPA limits the scope of § 101's coverage."61 Rather,
Congress provided different statutory "products"--each with its
own requirements and level of protection. 62 The utility patent
provides great protection while the PVPA provides less due to
exemptions for saving seed and research. Thus, inventors or
breeders may choose which "product," or patent, they want to
"purchase." This scheme may be comparable to how State
Departments of Motor Vehicles offer regular drivers' licenses as
well as commercial drivers' licenses. Each licensing scheme
entails certain rules, responsibilities, and privileges.

C. Issues Raised in the J.E.M. Case
Three primary issues were addressed in the J.E.M. case: (1)
congressional intent, (2) impermissible statutory overlap, and
59. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 18, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195) (referring to 7 U.S.C. § 2541(d), J.E.M. claimed that J.E.M. "didn't
do anything to infringe" on Pioneer's PVPA rights. 7 U.S.C. § 254l(d) says that
[Pioneer's] rights are not infringed by the "perform[ance of] any act concerning
[seed] ... of a protected variety [i.e., Pioneer's protected corn] that is sold or otherwise
marketed with the consent of the owner in the United States, unless the act involves
further propagation of the variety ....").
There is some ambiguity as to whether the word "sold" refers (1) only to Pioneer's
initial sale to J.E.M. or (2) to any sale of the protected seed. If situation (1) is correct,
then J.E.M. did nothing wrong because its buyer apparently did not further propagate
the variety. If interpretation (2) is correct, then it is immaterial that J.E.M.'s customer
did not further propagate the protected variety because J.E.M. sold the seed without
Pioneer's consent.
60. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 129.
61. ld. at 145.
62. ld. at 142 ("[T]here is a parallel relationship between the obligations and the
level of protection under each statute.").
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(3) the need for broad interpretation of patent laws. A few of
the Court's ancillary concerns are also noted below.

1. Congressional Intent
The outcome of the J.E.M. case largely depended on the
Court's interpretation of Congress's intent. J.E.M. argued that
Congress does not pass legislation to be redundant. "If the
patent laws before 1930 [i.e., the utility patent statute] allowed
patents on 'plants' then there would have been no reason for
Congress to have passed the 1930 PPA and to have limited the
scope of plant patent protection to plants reproduced by
asexual methods." 63
J .E.M. presented hard evidence
(documentation) of Congress's intent in passing the PVP A.
J.E.M. submitted page one of a House Report, which states the
following under the "Purpose" heading:
Under patent law, protection is presently limited to
those varieties of plants which reproduce asexually, that
is, by such methods as grafting or budding. No
protection is available to those varieties of plants which
reproduce sexually, that is, generally by seeds. Thus,
patent protection is not available with respect to new
varieties of most of the economically important
agricultural crops, such as cotton or soybeans. 64
This appears to be pretty clear evidence that Congress did not
intend for the utility patent to cover sexually-reproduced
plants.
J.E.M. argued that, in passing the PPA, the 1930 Congress
intended "to expand the definitional limits of [the utility patent
statute]." 65 Further, the 1930 Congress interpreted the utility
patent statute as not including plants. Thus, it was error for
the USPTO to ever issue a utility patent for a plant, and
Pioneer's patent was thus invalid. 66
Countering J.E.M.'s
63. Br. of Pet. at 19, J.E.M., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL 199137).
64. ld. at 40 (citing H.R. Rpt. 91-1605, at 6 (Oct. 13, 1970)).
65. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 10-11, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available
at 2001 WL 1196195); see Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (Jefferson authored the
Patent Act of 1793 in which he defined section 101 subject matter as "any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful
improvement [thereof]") (quoted in Cha.krabarty, 447 U.S. at 308).
G6. Br. of Pet. at 10, J.E.M., 531 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL 199137).
Utility patents that are issued to provide federal protection of sexually
reproducing corn plant varieties and their seeds are invalid. Seeds, seed
grown plants and the parts thereof are not included within the ambit of the
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argument, one Justice responded that the PPA did not
constitute "an explicit prohibition" against protecting plants
with a general utility statute. 67 The Court concluded that since
Congress did not explicitly state that plants were excluded from
section 101 coverage, utility patent coverage was available for
plants.

2. Impermissible Statutory Overlap
Besides arguing Congressional intent, J.E.M. raised the
issue of conflicting statutes. J.E.M. claimed that numerous
statutory provisions conflicted with those of the utility patent. 68
For example, the PVP A exempts research and saving seed,
whereas such uses are prohibited under the utility patent
statute. 69
J.E.M. argued that "[t]he issuance of PVP
certificates and utility patents on sexually reproducing plant
varieties ... would result in impermissible dual federal
protection and direct conflicts in the scope of the federal
protection granted on the same attribute-the ability to
sexually reproduce the plant variety." 70
As an amicus, the United States noted that the Department
of Agriculture, at the time of argument, had issued a total of
approximately 5,000 PVP certificates while the USPTO had
only issued about 1,800 utility patents for plants. 71 The
Government "s[aw] no incompatibility between the two systems
of protection." 72 The Court rebuffed J.E.M.'s argument and
found that the different provisions of the two laws "do not
present irreconcilable conflicts because the requirements for
obtaining a utility patent under§ 101 are more stringent than
those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the protections

utility patent subject matter .... Rather, federal protection of the corn seed
products at issue in this case is exclusively obtainable under the provisions of
the Plant Variety Protection Act ....
67. ld. at II (italics added) (at issue is the old legislative intent problem about
whether we assume the answer is "no" unless Congress specifically says "yes" or
whether we say "yes" unless Congress has explicitly indicated "no").
68. ld. at 22 24.
69. ld. at 22.
70. ld. at 10.
71. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 41, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195).
72. ld. at 41-42.

784

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

afforded by a utility patent are greater than those afforded by a
PVP certificate."73
Interestingly, as Pioneer began oral argument, Justice
Kennedy foreshadowed a possible concern of the Court. Justice
Kennedy stated that
in many statutes, if A, B, and C are covered [by section
101] and C [i.e., plant matter] is then removed [and
placed in section 161], we make the inference that C is
not intended to be covered any longer [by section 101].
But in this case, the under the sun language shows that
they are such expansive terms in [section] 101, that
perhaps we don't apply that usual rule and that
[Pioneer] would prevail because of the terms being so
general and so universal in ... their coverage. 74
The Court took the view that the 1952 Congress stated the
anything-under-the-sun 75 doctrine with the specific intent to
preserve section 101's broad application. Congress basically
said, "Yes, we are moving the PPA provisions to a separate
chapter, but the utility patent statute still applies to anything
under the sun, including new plant varieties."
Besides employing the anything-under-the-sun doctrine,
the majority used another canon of statutory construction to
justify its holding. This canon states that repeal by implication
is appropriate only "when the earlier and later statutes are
irreconcilable." 76 As mentioned before, the Court found no
irreconcilable conflicts because the utility patent statute, the
PPA, and the PVPA have different requirements and provide
different levels of protection. 77 The Court therefore held that
Congress did not intend to remove plants from section 101
coverage and that "neither the PP A nor the PVPA limits the
scope of§ 101's coverage."78

73. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 142.
74. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 24, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195).
75. Sen. Rep. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rpt. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
76. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 141-142 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550
(1974)).
77. ld. at 142.
78. ld. at 145.
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3. Need for Broad Interpretation of the Utility Patent Statute

Another important issue in the J.E.M. case was the need
for the Court to give a broad reading to the utility patent
statute. Pioneer argued that section 101 has always been
interpreted broadly because we never know what scientific
developments tomorrow will bring. The terms of section 101
"need to be general because the patent law needs to fit everchanging circumstances [and] because ... we are not in a
position to foresee what tomorrow's inventions will be." 79
Further, Pioneer noted that the "utility patent protection is so
critically important to people in [the seed] industry is
because . . . seeds are so easily copied by sclf-replicating." 80
The Court purposefully gave section 101 a broad reading
because "[a] rule that unanticipated inventions are without
protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent
law that anticipation undermines patentability." 81
At least one Justice expressed concern regarding the
research exemption during oral argument, referring to the
PVP A's research exemption as "a very important special
exemption." 82 In response, the United States explained that
section 101 did not have a research exemption for a reason.
"When greater research and development, greater disclosure,
and higher standards for qualifying a patent have been met,
there has been more of a contribution to public knowledge
which, under our intellectual property laws, justifies a greater
exclusive right for a limited period of time." 83
On the other hand, J.E.M. noted some drawbacks with
providing utility patent protection to plant materials.
"[P]atents are being used to stop ... the free use and
transmission of genetic material." 84 Recall that plant material
79. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 24, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195).
80. Id. at 35.
81. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316.
82. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 44, ,J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195).
83. ld. at 44.
84. Ld. at 22 (the PVPA's coverage of essentially derived varieties affects both
corporate and university breeders. Before the PVPA was enacted, breeders were free to
share plant genes. By combining genes in different ways, breeders could improve
crops. With the PVPA in force, protected varieties (containing genes that were
previously shared freely) are tied up, hindering breeding progress. Suppose, for
example, that Monsanto develops a superb gene that makes plants drought resistant,
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patented under section 101 is not freely available for research.
Because plant germplasm is being effectively "lock[ed] up" by
[utility] patent protection, the agricultural industry has
responded by consolidating. 85
Professor Jeff Maughan
explained that
conglomeration has occurred because, in the middle of
the biotech boom, large corporations realized it would be
more profitable to own an entire revenue stream from
development of genes to production of seed. Thus,
Monsanto purchased seed companies like Dekalb and
Asgrow, and DuPont purchased companies such as
Pioneer Hi-Bred International. Not only did these
acquisitions assure better revenues, but they also
provided access to the best available germplasm and to
established brand names, while protecting the
acquirer's outlet to the market.86
Oddly, J.E.M. raised this argument even though it is not a
research institution that is adversely affected by section 101's
lack of a research exemption.

D. Critique of the Court's Analysis
The majority in J.E.M. focused on two facts: (1) Under
Chakrabarty, the test is whether the invention is "humanmade" or a "product of nature." 87 (2) The PVP A does not
"purport to provide the exclusive statutory means of protecting
sexually reproduced plants." 88
In his dissent, Justice Breyer pointed out that the Court's
reliance on Chakrabarty is improper. He noted that the
question in Chakrabarty was whether § 101's "language
'manufacture, or composition of matter,' [citation omitted] ...
included such living things as bacteria-a substance to which
neither [the PPA nor the PVPA] refers." 89 Justice Breyer
raised a good point. The majority's reliance on Chakrabarty
would be more appropriate if Congress had been silent

and Pioneer develops a gene that makes the plants' fruit very delicious. The individual
varieties are PVP protected by the respective company. Unless some agreement is
made, we will never enjoy a plant that includes both genes and both characteristics.).
85. Id.
86. Cahoon, supra n. 40.
87. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 134 (citing Chakrabarty, 4-17 U.S. at :n:3).
88. Id. at 138.
89. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 148 (2002) (Breyer, J. dissenting).

771]

KEEP THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS COMING

787

regarding IP protection for plants. Here, however, Congress
provided explicit statutes covering plant varieties-the PPA
and the PVPA.
Thus, the question becomes, as Justice
Kennedy hinted, whether plants should be excepted from §
101's anything-under-the-sun rule since the PPA and PVPA
specifically provide IP protection for plant varieties.
However, even if plant varieties were properly excludable
from section 101 protection, plant biotechnology has developed
to the point at which protecting new varieties is only a small
portion of patentable plant matter. 90 The weakness in this
argument is that section 101 would still provide protection for
"processes" and "compositions of [plant] matter" that do not fall
under the PVPA's purview. 91
Furthermore, the Court's holding perpetuated the USPTO's
established practice of issuing utility patents for plant
varieties. Justice Thomas noted that the USPTO has already
issued "some 1,800 utility patents for plants, plant parts, and
seeds." 92 In contrast, as of November 12, 2002, the USPTO had
granted approximately 13,230 plant patents under section 161
(PPA). 93
Justice Ginsburg raised another point in favor of affirming
the decision in favor of Pioneer. She suggested that it may be
proper for the Court to pay some deference to the USPTO and
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals since those entities have
more expertise in patent matters. 94

E. Implications of the Court's Holding
The J.E.M. holding will have a significant effect on seed
manufacturers, farmers, and universities. Seed manufacturers
may rest assured that first, they will be able to obtain utility
patent coverage for the varieties they develop and second, that
90. Br. for Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Property Law Assn. in Support of
Respt. Supporting Affirmance at 4, .J.E.M., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (available at 2001 WL
649829).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
92. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 127.
93. See e.{?. plant patent number PP13,233, USPTO, USPTO Patent Full-Text and
image Database, <http://patft. uspto.gov/netahtmllsrchnum.htm>.
94. S. Ct. Oral Argument at 8, J.E.M. (No. 99-1996) (Oct. 3, 2001) (available at
2001 WL 1196195) (question from Justice Ginsburg to J.E.M.: "As far as ... the issue
that is before us, we do have a position of the PTO and of the Federal circuit, both
having more expertise than the rest of the Federal court we're on in these questions.
Don't we owe those decision makers some deference?").
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they may force farmers to purchase new seed. As utility
patent-protected seeds come to dominate the seed market,
farmers will lose the legal ability to save seed for replanting
the next season. Thus, farmers' seed costs will rise; however,
the farmer will probably avoid some costs for pesticide,
herbicide, or weather-related crop loss, depending on the type
of GM seed used.
As the biotech revolution rolls on, small-scale farmers will
come into more frequent contact with patent issues. "Most all
of the new seeds being developed, whether genetically modified
or convention[al], are being patented."95 This can be an
especially controversial issue since some seed developers are
allowed to patent the seeds they develop with government
funding (tax monies).96
Universities engaged in plant genetic research will also be
affected by the J.E.M. holding. Because the Court upheld the
applicability of section 101 to plants, the university can require
remuneration if someone uses the university's patented
germplasm even for research. Recall that researchers are not
required to give remuneration if the plant variety they are
using is merely protected by a PVP certificate. Under the
PVPA, the university can only prevent unlicensed persons from
selling the protected variety or "using it in producing (as
distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different
variety .... "97
It is very difficult to accurately quantify the financial
effects universities would feel if they were limited to PVP or
PP A protection. From a financial standpoint, allowing the
section 101 to cover plants is good for universities because it
allows them to obtain stronger protection of valuable
discoveries and thus receive greater remuneration via licensing

95. Marilyn Bay Wentz, Whose Seed is it Anyway?, Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union,
<http://www.rmfu.org/News/Stories/ShowFeature.cfm?ID=81> (accessed Dec. 5, 2002)
(Ms. Wentz quotes Dave Dechant, an alfalfa, wheat, corn and barley producer from Ft.
Lupton, Colorado: "The rights granted by patents are broad and give patent owners
market rights, which mean[s] [that] future seed contracts could obligate the grower to
market his product through specific channels .... Such agreements would have serious,
long-term negative consequences for America's independent family farmers and
ranchers.").
96. Id. ("Purdue University's recent development of nematode resistant soybeans
incorporated public funding and producer checkoff dollars. Private company Access
Plant Technology, Inc., now has an exclusive license to the soybean seed patent.").
97. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(l) (2000).
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revenues. Accordingly, universities have more bargaining
power now that plants are clearly patentable subject matter
under the utility patent statute.
However, the days of easy-come, easy-go research are
waning. Greater use of IP protection for plants makes it more
difficult and expensive for the research community to build on
the discoveries of universities that hold utility patents.
Information sharing is hindered because researchers are less
likely to reveal their findings until they know whether or not
their findings are patentable. Also, utility patent protection for
plants makes research more expensive because, without a
research exemption, one university cannot freely use plant
material that has been patented by another university. Of
course, the utility patent holder can simply enter an agreement
to allow other universities to use the protected plant for
research purposes, but creating such a legal arrangement
entails its own costs. To be fair, such an agreement could
include a license provision requiring the university to forfeit or
share revenue derived from discoveries that stem from use of
the protected plant material.
Ill. UNIVERSITIES' USE OF IP LAWS TO PROTECT THEIR PLANT
GENETIC RESEARCH

IP protection is important to universities that engage in
plant genetic research. This section will discuss (1) how
universities have been a major player in plant genetic research;
(2) universities' and corporations' use of intellectual property to
protect their plant genetic research; (3) collaboration between
universities and private corporations; (4) collaboration between
the federal government and universities; (5) the influence of
the Bayh-Dole Act; (6) universities' interaction with foreign
entities; and (7) trends involving plant IP.

A. Universities' Historical Role in Plant Genetic Research
Universities have played a major role in plant genetic
research. One professor noted, "Transgenic plants currently in
production [such as corn, soybean, and canola] were developed
by corporate scientists. Nonetheless, the basic discoveries ... ,
without which plant biotechnology would be impossible, were
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mostly made in university laboratories." 98
Some specific
examples are notable. In 1976, Dr. Mary-Dell Chilton led a
group of researchers at the University of Washington in
discovering that "a bacterial cell could transfer some DNA to a
plant cell." 99
While studying as a graduate student at
Washington State University, Ray Sheehy helped develop the
FlavrSavr® tomato plant, the first transgenic plant
commercialized in the United States. 100 In 1983, Washington
University, St. Louis, joined the University of Ghent and
Monsanto Corporation in DNA uptake experiments involving
gene transfer. Today, Agrobacterium-mediated gene transfer is
a widely-applied technique used "to achieve the transfer of
DNA to plants." 101 Further, Roger Beachy of Washington
University, St. Louis, is a pioneer in the production of virusresistant plants, 102 and Steven Tanksley and his lab at Cornell
University have contributed to the discovery and cloning of
pathogen-resistance genes. 10 3

B. Universities' and Corporations' Different Approaches to
Plant-Related Intellectual Property
Universities and private corporations approach patents
differently. This section will discuss how universities and
private corporations differ in (1) their reliance on patenting
and licensing revenue; (2) the research projects they choose to
pursue; (3) the emphasis they place on publishing findings
versus maintaining confidentiality; (4) their incentive to recoup
investment; and (5) their use of plant patents and PVP
certificates.

1. Patents and Licenses as New Sources of Revenue
While corporations have long recognized the value of
patents and licenses, universities are still discovering these
new revenue streams. As the IP trend continues, professors
will likely feel more incentive to become IP-savvy as their
universities turn toward patents to protect their inventions, to
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Paul F_ Lurquin, High Tech Harvest 116 (Westview Press 2002)_
!d. at 79.
!d. at 190, ch. 5, n. L
!d. at 93.
!d. at 106.
!d. at 108.
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maintain their freedom to operate, and to generate a revenue
stream. 104 The university system is simple. Universities
patent their inventions and then publish their findings;
thereafter, corporations read about the new technology and
seek a license from the university. Licensing often leads to
profit sharing agreements between the researcher-inventor and
the university. 105 For universities, a new revenue stream
means more funding, improved programs and facilities, and
ultimately better education for students. 106
Further, university professors are generally not paid
exorbitant salaries, so a new revenue source-i.e., from patents
and licensing-may be very attractive. 107 However, licensing
revenue is not a university's nor a professor's sole interest.
Receiving a royalty from a plant patent or license is "icing on
the cake" so to speak. 108 Most universities still focus on doing
good research; but if money from patents or licenses is
available, universities will pursue it. 109

2. Subjects of Research-Which Project to Pursue?
Universities and corporations differ in the research projects
they choose to pursue. University professors are more likely to
look at long-term research even though it might have very little

104. Cahoon, supra n. 40.
105. ld.; see Boyce Thompson Inst., BTl Pat. Policy, <http://bti.cornell.edu/bti2/
bti2 __ page.taf'?page=patent_policy> (accessed Nov. 16, 2002) (Cornell's Boyce Thompson
Institute, a plant research facility, maintains a patent policy that seeks to "assure that
creative works at the institute are encouraged and rewarded while providing for the
public good. Often this can best be achieved by patent protection of inventions in order
to encourage industrial commercialization of research results, while benefiting BTl and
the individual inventors.").
106. Cahoon, supra n. 40; see Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept
University,
The
Atlantic
Online
<http://www .theatlantic.com/cgibin/o/issues/2000/03/press.htm> (accessed Dec. 14, 2002) (Gordon Rausser, who
negotiated a deal between University of California, Berkeley and Novartis, argues in
support of university-corporation partnerships. A Berkeley alumni magazine quotes
Rausser as saying, "Without modern laboratory facilities and access to commercially
developed proprietary databases . . . we can neither provide first-rate graduate
education nor perform the fundamental research that is part of the University's
mission.") (original article printed in The Atlantic Monthly (Boston) (Mar. 2000)).
107. Cahoon, supra n. 10.
108. ld.
109. Id.; see Blumenstyk, supra n. 1 (Dr. Donald Young and the University of
Rochester are engaged in "the highest-ante patent battle ever undertaken by a
university." They are "seeking billions of dollars in royalties from the companies that
make and market Celebrex, an enormously successful arthritis drug.").
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economic value. On the other hand, corporations are more
likely to do a cost-benefit analysis to estimate the profitability
of a potential research project. no Also, some large corporations
are becoming specialists in applied plant genetic research,
seeking to incorporate university discoveries into marketable
products.m
Universities and private corporations may have different
motives for researching the negative aspects of their
experiments in plant genetics. One view is that corporations
do not have as much incentive to research possible negative
effects of their biotech products because they focus on
profitability rather than environmental or health concerns. 112
One concerned individual noted that corporations tend to
limit the scope of research that they fund, and are
unlikely to support research intended to produce
findings that extend general scientific know ledge. They
often are unwilling to fund the extensive exploration
that may be necessary to explore all of the possible
negative and harmful effects that may result from use of
the products of such research. 113
However, another view is that corporations monitor their
biotech products because profitability is undermined if the
genetically-altered gene breaks down and harms the
environment or human health. Thus, corporations do have a
motive to research the negative effects of their products (e.g.,
genetically-modified seeds).ll4
On the other hand, universities are less concerned with
profitability because they have other sources of revenue such
as state budget appropriations. Universities are also more
likely to conduct research that will benefit the general
public. 115

llO. Cahoon, supra n. 40.
lll. ld.
112. E-mail from Michael Marsh, Bd. Member at Large, C. Puget Sound Ch.,
Wash. Native Plant Socy., to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 10, 2002) (copy on file with Mr.
Daniels).
113. ld.
114. Cahoon, supra n. 40.
115. Marsh, supra n. 112 ("A research university with funding from a public
agency would be much more likely to support research by faculty members in areas
that may produce discoveries which will either extend and enlarge our general
scientific knowledge, or will be immediately (and obviously) beneficial to members of
the general public. There will also, very likely, be more collateral research to explore
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3. Publishing Findings and Maintaining Confidentiality
Universities are generally more concerned with publishing
their findings, while corporations are generally more concerned
with maintaining confidentiality until their discovery is
patented.ll 6 This is an important difference because
patentability is undermined if "the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States." 117 In collaborating
with universities, corporations are reasonably concerned that
the university may prematurely release the corporately-funded
invention into the public domain. Such release undermines
patentability and the corporation's potential revenue stream. 118
4. Recouping Their Investment
Unlike universities, corporations require patents as a
means to recoup their investment.l 19 While other sources of
possible negative consequences of use of such discoveries. Such collateral research is
required by law in certain fields of investigation (for example, before drugs for human
use are released by the Food and Drug Administration), but are not uniformly required
in agriculture (despite limited jurisdiction by the Environmental Protection Agency) or
many other fields.").
116. E-mail from Stephen Smith, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. to Timothy P.
Daniels (Nov. 25, 2002) (copy on frle with Mr. Daniels) (e-mail includes language from
,John Grace, Germplasm Licensing Coord., Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.) (In
negotiating with corporations, "Universities almost always require the right to
continue to use their invention, and often want the right to publish their results and
sometimes [the corporation's] own [results]. Generally we [the corporation] can get
around this [i.e., can forestall publication and thus preserve patentability] with a
review period for evaluating an invention for patentability.
Some amount of
confidentiality is required for us [corporations]."). See E-mail from Daniel Fairbanks,
Professor, Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., B.Y.U., to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 20, 2002)
(copy on file with Mr. Daniels) (Prof. Daniel Fairbanks noted, "Since publication is the
expected outcome of any research at a university, defensive publishing is a much better
way to protect our work. There is little to no commercial potential for most of the
products we produce, so the only reason to patent them is to prevent others from
patenting them. Since defensive publishing is much less expensive and easier than
patenting, it makes sense for us to use it.").
117. 35 U .S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
118. Smith, supra n. 116 (e-mail language from John Grace in Smith e-mail).
119. I d. (language of Stephen Smith) ("The ability to obtain patents for inventions
in plant breeding is critical to ... maintaining research investments.") See generally
Stephen Smith, NIAB, BBP Satellite 1 Colloquium Within the Generic Project Meeting:
Molecular Tools for Biodiversity, Vienna, December 1996 (published in Molecular
Screening News No, 11) Plant Variety Identification & Registration (available at
<http://www.niab.com/bbp/vienna.htm>) (accessed Dec. 2, 2002) (Dr. Smith noted, "If
we suspect someone is using our material unlawfully, we send our lawyers out to see
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revenue help immunize universities from investors' hesitations,
private plant genetics research companies are vulnerable to
market fluctuations. 12 0 Thus, if the Court had ruled against
Pioneer Hi-Bred in the J.E.M. case (i.e., had held that plants
cannot be protected by section 101 utility patents), universities
would not have been as affected as plant biotech corporations.
Plant biotech companies are very vocal whenever IP protection
for plants is threatened; 121 hence, in the J.E.M. case,
corporations such as Monsanto, Cargill, BASF, and Delta Pine
and Land Company submitted amicus briefs supporting
Pioneer, even though Pioneer was a business competitor.
While universities have less need to recoup their
investment, they do have an interest in the revenue and
prestige that can accompany a valuable patent. For example,
Columbia University's "royalty revenue for the 2000 fiscal year
was more than $143 million." 122 University researchers still
have financial incentive to conduct research because they
receive a cut of the royalties. 123 Incidentally, from a brief
him or her. For example in 1980, we found what we thought was one of our inbreds in
the background of another [competitor's) hybrid in the U.S. and we sued. Things
progress[ed] very slowly in the U.S. courts but they finally ruled in 1994 that indeed
that company had used our germ plasm. .
So in 1994 we rec.eiv.ed a ch.eque for [46. 7]
million dollars, so ... there is real money involved here.") ($46.7 million figure
provided in e-mail from Stephen Smith, Pioneer Hi-Bred, Inc., to Timothy P. Daniels
(,Jan. 8, 2003)).
120. SeedQuest, News Releases, Bionova R&D Operations at DNA Plant
Technology Corporation to be Shut Down, <http://www .seedquest.com/News/releases/
2002/may/4464.htm> (accessed Nov. 16, 2002). ("The focus of DNAP's [DNA Plant
Technology Corporation] research has been the production of transgenic plants which
provide improved disease resistance for fruit and vegetable crops. Concerns about
public acceptance of transgenic products in these markets have made producers
reluctant to invest in the development of transgenic fruits and vegetables. Further, the
agricultural industry has been suffering with reduced prices in the past few years,
leading growers, food companies and other providers to delay new R&D investment.
Despite an intensive search, these factors have made it difficult for the company to
develop new customers. With this absence of a customer base, DNAP has not been able
to obtain venture capital or other financing sufficient to continue R&D operations.").
121. Smith, supra n. 116 (language of John Grace) (if utility patent coverage of
plants were threatened, "[u]niversities might not scream to the same extent we
[corporations] would, because while their licensing is important to both revenue
generation and also to maximum consumer benefit, the revenue stream is not their life
blood (as it is ours).").
122. Goldie Blumenstyk, Knowledge is 'a Form of Venture Capital' for a Top
Columbia Administrator, Chron. of Higher gduc. A24 (Feb. 9, 2001).
123. "In general, BTl will reward researchers for generating Patents by
distributing 30% of net revenues from licensing arrangements to Inventors. . . . The
remaining 70% of net revenues shall be utilized by BTL" Boyce Thompson In st., supra
n. 105.
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review of the USPTO database, it appears that individual
inventors, professors and researchers receive the patent, but
they list the university's research foundation as the assignee. 124
Bio-ag companies have invested years' of research in
developing genetically modified crops that can resist
herbicides, insects, and climate fluctuations.
Patents,
including PVP certificates, are virtually the only means of
protecting a corporation's investment and making its efforts
profitable. In a full-page advertisement in an agricultural
journal, the Monsanto Corporation asked farmers to refrain
from illegally replanting patented seed and thus protect the
economic incentive to invest m bio-ag research and
development. 125
One might assume that universities have less to lose
because they may receive federal grant funding; however,
patents are still important to universities for a variety of
reasons. Patenting a valuable discovery can bring prestige and
significant revenue.
Further, patenting is "seen as very
favorable" and may have a positive effect on professors'
compensation and eligibility for tenure or promotion. 126
Though not required for tenure, patenting is a "leveraging
point." 127 Professors who patent their valuable research may
be more likely to abandon ship and go work for a private
company that can offer a better salary. If the university is
going to retain such valuable, patenting professors, the

124. See e.g. patents 5,648, 599; 6,420,547; 6,395,964; and 6,268,552 at USPTO,
supra n. 9:l.
125. Monsanto's advertisement read:
It takes millions of dollars and years of research to develop the biotech crops
that deliver superior value to growers. And future investment in biotech
research depends on companies' ability to share in the added value created by
these crops. Consider what happens if growers save and replant patented
seed. First, there is less incentive for all companies to invest in future
technology, such as the development of seeds with traits that produce higheryielding, higher-value and drought-tolerant crops .... In short, these few
growers who save and replant patented seed jeopardize the future
availability of innovative biotechnology for all growers. And that's not fair to
anyone.
See Martha L. Crouch, How the Terminator Terminates, Synthesis/Regeneration 18
(Winter 1999) (available at <http://web.greens.org/s-r/18/18-16.html>) (accessed Nov. 9,
2002).
126. Interview with Jeff Maughan, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci.,
B.Y.U. (,Jan. 6, 200:3).
127. ld.
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university will probably need to increase their compensation or
recognize the professor's value in some other way.
Because universities generally do not have a profit motive,
they are less concerned with potential patent infringement
when choosing among different lab techniques.
Dr. Paul
Lurquin implies this in his recent book, High Tech Harvest:
[T]oday there are two techniques very widely applied to
achieve the transfer of DNA to plants: One is the
Agrobacterium-mediated gene transfer and the other is
biolistics [or "gene gun technology"].
Of the two,
academic scientists much prefer the first one, owing to
its predictability and versatility-it works well with
numerous types of plants. Corporate scientists are more
divided; for them, patents and potential patent
infringements are as great a concern as the feasibility of
the techniques themselves. 128
Royalties from utility patents can be substantial, although
they do not provide the university with a predictable source of
income since researchers usually do not know when they will
make a valuable discovery.
Furthermore, although some
university researchers may not expect to license their
inventions immediately, they may nonetheless obtain a patent
because it "might be useful some day." 12 9
It is difficult to quantify the value that a breakthrough
discovery can have to a university because a patent's value can
be measured in various ways. 130 Methods of measuring value
include the following: (1) licensing revenue for the university
and the patenting professor, (2) positive publicity (which may
help in recruiting top researchers and students), (3) increased
likelihood that the university or its researchers may receive
future federal funding for continued research, and (4) a good
reputation among potential donors and industry.

128. Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 93.
129. E-mail from Adam Bogdanove, Asst. Prof., Dept. of Plant Pathology, Iowa St.
U., to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels).
130. "How do you measure [the) value [of a patent]? By how much revenue the
patent brings in? Or by how much it boosts a company's market value?" Godwin &
Slind-Flor, supra n. fi7. SP.P. How Colleges Get More Bang (or Less) From Technology
Transfer, Chron. of Higher Educ. (July 19, 2002) ("For the growing number of
universities eager to commercialize the inventions of their professors and graduate
students, success-and failure--is measured in many ways. Money is only the most
obvious one.").
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5. Universities' and Corporations' Use of Plant Patents and PVP
Certificates

Despite the important role that university researchers
continue to play in the development of plant genetic
technologies, private corporations hold the overwhelming
majority of the plant patents and PVP certificates. Data from
the USPTO provided the following information: From 1977 to
2001, Yoder Brothers, a corporation, received 599 plant patents
from the USPTO.l 31 Yoder was the top plant patentee during
this period. The second and third places were also held by
corporations: Bear Creek Gardens, Inc. received 263 plant
patents, and Canard-Pyle Company received 216 patents.l 32
In first place among universities was the Regents of
University of California, ranked thirteenth overall, receiving
eighty-two plant patents. Holding the second place among
universities was Rutgers University (thirty-eighth on list),
which received only thirty-four plant patents. Obviously,
universities have received (and have probably applied for) far
fewer plant patents than private corporations.
This phenomenon may be partly due to the fact that
university researchers are less concerned with patents than
corporate researchers or that they may not be as
knowledgeable about the provisions of IP law. 133 Being more
IP-savvy, corporations succeeded in patenting plants and
processes that were primarily developed m university
lab ora tories. 134

131. USPTO, Information Products Division/TAF Branch, Plant Patents: January
1, 1977-December 31, 2001, <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taflplant.pdf>
(accessed Nov. 25, 2002).
132. Id.
133. For example, Prof. Paul Lurquin noted that the Monsanto team
"demonstrated great foresight" in 1983 when it-along with research teams from
University of Ghent and Washington University, St. Louis-developed Agrobacterium
mediated gene transfer while studying crown gall.
At that point [in 1983], no patents had been granted to anybody, simply
because it was not yet an accepted norm (as it is today) for academic
scientists to file patent applications for their discoveries.
Monsanto's
participation in fundamental crown gull research would allow the company to
claim precedence in the field of plant genetic engineering.
Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 82.
134. Id. ("Academic scientists have been remarkably incompetent at protecting
their intellectual property. Although some have had foresight to protect their work, by
and large, they never realized that their work would have the impact-good or badthat it now has on society. The field was wide open for corporations to claim ownership
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Although universities use plant patents, corporations are
the primary users. A USPTO report provided the following
data regarding the numbers of plant patents granted to
universities from 1977 to 2001, inclusive, as well as the
universities' overall rank among corporations, universities, and
government agencies: 135
,~

Universities' Use of Section 161 Plant Patents: 1977-2001
Rank
Among Universities
1

2
3
4
5
6

7

8

9

10
11

12
1a
14
15

University Name
Regents of University
of California
Rutgers University
Cornell Research
Foundation, Inc.
Purdue Research
Foundation
University of
Arkansas
Iowa State University
Research Foundation,
Inc.
Regents of University
of Minnesota
Washington State
University Research
Foundation, Inc.
Colorado State
University Research
Foundation
University of Illinois
Board of Regents of
University of
Nebraska
TexasA&M
University System
University of
Connecticut
University of Florida
Board of Regents
University of
Tennessee Research
Corporation

Number Of
Plant Patents
Received

Overall Rank

82

13

34
23

38
49

22

52

12

95

11

103

11

108

10

116

8

126

7

6

145
163

5

191

5

192

5

193

5

194

These top fifteen university entities obtained a total of only
246 plant patents during the noted twenty-five-year period.

of basic technologies that most of them hardly helped develop (except through financial
support).").
135. USPTO, supra n. 131.

771]

KEEP THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS COMING

799

United States corporations (including the universities), the
United States Government, and United States individuals
obtained a total of 5, 788 plant patents during the noted time
period. Thus, the top fifteen universities (including research
foundations and Boards of Regents) obtained only 4.3 percent
of the plant patents granted. 136 Though not precise, the 4.3
percent figure is sufficiently accurate to tell us that
universities received comparatively few plant patents.
It is clear that corporations, not universities, are the major
players in patenting plants. The USPTO plant patent report
also indicates that United States corporations received 4, 183
plant patents since 1977. Thus, out of all United States
corporations, universities as a subset received only 246 of the
4,183 or 5.9 percent of all the plant patents.l37
The same pattern seems to hold true with PVP certificates.
During FY 1971-2002, public sources (i.e., universities and
agricultural experiment stations) submitted an average of
thirteen percent of the PVP applications received each year by
the
PVP
Office. 138
Browsing through the
PVP
139
Application/Certificate Status Database,
one notices that
private corporations are the predominant applicants. 140
Although corporations dominate the PVP statistics, it appears
that universities have a bit more use for the PVP than the
PPA.
Let's not be misled, however. Just because corporations
receive more plant patents and PVP certificates does not mean
that these protections are not vital to universities. Without IP
protection and the consequent licensing revenues, research

136. This statistic is not entirely accurate, however, because the USPTO report
contains only "national and international organizations (i.e., corporations, universities,
government agencies) that have received five or more U.S. plant patents since 1977."
/d.

137. Again, this statistic only accounts for entities that received at least five plant
patents during the noted time period.
138. E-mail from Janice M. Strachan, Senior Examiner, Plant Variety Protection
Office, to Timothy P. Daniels (Nov. 21, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels). Ms.
Strachan provided data in a table entitled University-Applicants.
139. Plant Variety Protection Office, PVP Application/Certificate Status Database,
<http://www.ars-grin.gov/cgi-bin/npgs/html/pvplist.pl> (accessed Nov. 25, 2002).
140. The student author conducted a search of the PVP Applicant/Certificate
Status Database, inserting "university'' in the "Applicant or Owner Name" field. The
search resulted in a list of approximately 300 PVP certificates granted to university
entities. The 300 "hits" included about 100 PVP certificates issued for varieties of
common wheat and about 70 certificates issued for varieties of soybean.
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universities would have less financial ability to carry on their
plant genetics research programs. They would have to find
other funding sources or scale back their research.
In fact, university usage of patents is taking off. Even
"community colleges are beginning to develop intellectualproperty policies to ensure that they and their faculty members
can capitalize financially on the research conducted on their
campuses." 141 Universities that do not become IP-savvy may
forego a potential revenue stream and may be more likely to
infringe on others' patents, thus becoming subject to lawsuits
for patent infringement.

C. Collaboration Between Universities and Private
Corporations
Universities and private agribusiness corporations often
seek mutually-beneficial relationships through licensing and
through research partnerships. 142
Universities frequently
discover or invent something that the corporations find useful
and profitable. However, universities usually lack the means
to prepare their invention for commercial production and
marketing. Since "strong IP on its own is useless," professors
work with their technology transfer offices to license the
valuable invention to a corporation that has the resources to
incorporate the technology into publicly usable goods. 143

141. How Colleges Get More Bang (or Less) From Technology Transfer, supra n.
130 (This article includes the results of a study conducted by The Chronicle. The
Chronicle "analyzed the most recent five years of annual data from the Association of
University Technology Managers on universities' efforts to commercialize technology,
and developed indicators to compare institutions.").
142. Smith, supra n. 116 (cited portion from John Grace though e-mail sent via
Stephen Smith) ("We at Pioneer like to think we have very close, cordial and mutually
beneficial relationships with a large number of universities, and in particular with
universities with plant genetics research programs.").
Further, Stephen Jones, an instructor of graduate courses at Washington State
University, noted that "the University of Idaho, North Dakota State University, the
University of Minnesota and Oregon State University have ... agreements with
Monsanto to produce herbicide resistant wheat." TomPaine.common sense, Tn (Seed)
Bed Together, <http://tompaine.com/feature.cfm/ID/5116> (accessed Dec. ao, 2002).
143. Smith, supra n. 119 ("Having strong IP on something on its own is useless-it
has to be coupled with and incorporated into a product that people are willing to
purchase if its going to have any impact. [Corporations such as] Pioneer can provide
the genetic vehicles into which useful traits can be added that make the overall genetic
package more valuable and a better investment for their customer to purchase ....
[Corporations] also have a superb ability to ramp up seed production and to get
products to the market place."). See Goldie Blumenstyk, U. of Michigan Finds Good
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Universities maintain technology transfer offices or research
foundations that have the responsibility
to facilitate the transfer to industry of technology from
[the university] and thereby to benefit the public good
through the development and subsequent sale of
commercial products. A secondary goal is to generate
unrestricted funds to motivate inventors and to support
research and education at [the university]. 144
While partnerships between universities and corporations
may be beneficial, they may also be controversial. Historically,
universities have been considered institutions of research and
education rather than business ventures with a profit motive.
This traditional emphasis is being seriously questioned:
"Commercially sponsored research is putting at risk the
paramount value of higher education-disinterested inquiry.
Even more alarming, ... universities themselves are behaving
more and more like for-profit companies" 145 by "forming forprofit companies to commercialize their professors' research." 146
A specific concern with seed companies striking deals with
public land grant universities is that such partnerships
constitute an "abandonment of science that addresses true
needs in favor of solving only problems that have proprietary or
profit-driven answers." 147 Lastly, some have concerns that
private corporations sometimes "buy out" the research interests
of university professors or do not pay a fair price to license
valuable university discoveries. 148
University -corporation partnerships also raise questions
about the purpose of public universities. 149 Opponents of
Research Is Not Enough, Chron. of Higher Educ. A24 (July 19, 2002).
144. Mass. Inst. of Tech., Tech. Licensing Off., MIT Reports to the President 20002001 <http://web.mit.edu/communications/pres01109.15.htm I> (accessed Jan. 18, 2003).
Since they "deriv[e] [their] support ... largely from public sources," state universities
may be more inclined to "dedicate[] [their] activities and services to the promotion and
support of public welfare." Iowa St. U., Statement of Patent Policy,
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/-isurf/policy/patentpolicy.html> (revised and improved
Oct. 21, 1982).
145. Press & Washburn, supra n. 106.
146. Lori B. Andrews, Money is Putting People at Risk in Biomedical Research,
Chron. of Higher Educ. B4 (Mar. 10, 2000).
147. Jones, supra n. 142.
148. Maughan, supra n. 126.
149. Peter Schmidt, States Push Public Universities to Commercialize Research:
Conflict-of-Interest Fears Take Back Seat to Economic Development, Chron. of Higher
Educ. A26 (Mar. 29, 2002) (Schmidt quotes Virginia A. Sharpe, director of the Integrity
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university
privatization
(i.e.,
close
business/funding
relationships between universities and corporations) are
concerned that university-corporate ties will result in loss of
academic freedom, conflicts of interest, and the use of public
funds for private gain. On the other hand, supporters of
university-corporation partnerships and stronger technology
transfer programs argue that such partnerships will result in
local economic development and improved educational
opportunities. 15 Further, the proponents argue that the
partnerships are a financial necessity and are needed to attract
talented researchers to campus. 151
Occasionally, universities' and corporations' interests
conflict, resulting in lawsuits for patent infringement.l 52 In
addition, universities sometimes require indemnification when
negotiating with corporations about corporate funding of
university research. 15 3
Corporations are sometimes reluctant to work with
universities for a variety of reasons. First, the corporation may
not need the university; typically, large corporations have wellendowed laboratories that yield more reliable data. Further,
large corporations are more likely to have specialized
equipment such as robotics that can work around the clock,
unlike a team of graduate students. The corporation may
dislike having to enter lengthy negotiations with the
university's technology transfer staff. However, if a university
professor has a significant "head-start" on some commercially

°

in Science Project at the Center for Science in the Public Interest. "Obviously. we need
to have a public debate about what our public universities are for.").
150. ld. Further, regarding the issue of using public funds for private gain, Joel
Hardi noted:
The Kellogg Commission on the Future of State and Land-Grant
Universities, a 24-member panel that was established in 1996, issued a
report calling on governments and colleges to collaborate to broaden access to
higher education and improve relations with their surrounding communities,
to make the nation's public colleges 'the public's universities,' as Lincoln
envisioned when he signed the Morrill Act in 1862.

Land-Grant Presidents Call for New 'Covenant' With State and U.S. Gouernments,
Chron. of Higher Educ. A41 (Mar. 31, 2000).
151. Schmidt, supra n. 149.
152. See supra n. 1 (regarding patent infringement suit by University of Rochester
against makers of Celebrex).
153. Smith, supra n. 116 (language of John Grace) ("Indemnification provisions
tend to loom, depending upon who is performing what activity.").

771]

KEEP THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS COMING

803

valuable research, the corporation will be more likely to seek
some partnership. 154
Consulting is a less formal way in which corporations and
universities interact. It is common practice for university
professors to moonlight as consultants to outside entities.
"[M]ost universities encourage the [moonlighting or consulting]
activity because they believe it helps to keep the faculty
members fresh." 155
However, such professor-corporation
interaction can be problematic for universities that are trying
to keep close tabs on the intellectual property developed on
their campus, to which the universities have some rights to
royalties. 156 Also, though professors are often viewed as being
unbiased sources of expertise, professor-consultants are subject
to the same pressures as other expert witnesses when called to
testifY on behalf of a company seeking to win a lawsuit.I 57
Despite the above criticisms, there are some positive
aspects to university-corporation partnerships.
First,
professors can use their corporate ties to help place students in
coveted internships.
Second, corporate guidance or
sponsorship can help professors avoid investing in useless or
inane research projects. 158

D. Federal Government- University Partnership: Government
Grants to Universities
Universities often receive federal funding for their plant
research programs, while corporations generally do not.l 59 Due
154. Maughan, supra n. 126.
155. Blumenstyk, supra n. 1.
156. ld. ("When professors consult on projects that overlap with their university
research, and they happen to invent something, it can be difficult to sort out who has
the rights to the invention." Blumenstyk suggests that universities should have
"conflict-of-interest polices that clearly establish how intellectual property will be
managed in consulting situations" (quoting M. Guven Yalcintas, Vice President for
Technology Transfer for the Research Foundation of State University of New York)).
157. Maughan, supra n. 126.
158. Jd.

159. See e.g. USDA, ARS National Agricultural Library, Plant Genome Data &
Information
Center,
1997
USDA-NRI
Plant
Genome
Awards,
<http://www.nal.usda.gov/pgdic/pggrantinfo/1997/> (accessed Jan. 2, 2003); USDA,
Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program, Abstracts of Funded
Research- Fiscal Year 2001, <http://www .reeusda.gov/crgam/biotechrisk/biotO 1nt.htm>
(accessed Jan. 2, 2003). However, "(USDA Plant Genome] Grant recipients can be
State agricultural experiment stations, colleges and universities, ... and even private
organizations, corporations, or individuals." ,John D. Copeland, Nat!. Ctr. for Agric. L.
Research & Info., U. of Ark., USDA Grants Boost Plant Genome Research,
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to their mission, land grant universities have special ties to the
federal government. Overall, however, private investment in
agricultural research has increased in importance to plant
breeders, while the ratio of investment by government has
decreased. 160
One commentator noted that the growing
percentage of biotech investment is primarily due to private
corporations investing in their own private research. Though
public funding may have "dried up" a bit due to economic
doldrums, university researchers can still seek public funding
through the USDA or National Institutes of Health. 16 1
University researchers commonly receive research funding
from the United States Department of Agriculture Agricultural
Research Service (ARS). 162 In addition, funding occasionally
comes from other federal sources such as National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF). 16 3

<http://warp.nal.usda.gov/pgdic/Probe/v1n3_ 4/usdagrant.html> (accessed Jan. 2, 2003)
(citing 7 U .S.C. § 450(i)(b)( 1)).
160. Smith, supra n. 119 (NIAB) ("Financial resources for breeding come from
three sources; public taxation, private investment and sale of commercial products.
Fewer funds for plant breeding are coming from tax revenues. Since 1977, most
agricultural research in the US has come from the private sector. In 1994, public
expenditures on agricultural research, in the U.S., were approximately $2.7 billion;
private expenditures were approximately $3.7 billion (Fuglie et al., 1996). Therefore,
many further benefits that can accrue to farmers and consumers from improved
productivity generated by plant breeding will not be forthcoming unless private
investment into breeding can be sustained or further increased. Private investment
does not occur without strong intellectual property protection (IPP)."). See Press &
Washburn, supra n. 106 ("[T]he rate of growth in federal support has fallen steadily
over the past twelve years, as the cost of doing research, particularly in the cuttingedge fieldO of ... molecular biology, has risen sharply. State spending has also
declined .... Meanwhile, corporate giving is on the rise, growing from $850 million in
1985 to $4.25 billion less than a decade later-and increasingly the money comes with
strings attached.").
161. Maughan, supra n. 126.
162. See e.g. USDA (1997 USDA-NRI), supra n. 159; USDA (Biotech. Risk), supra
n. 159.
163. See e.g. Henry Daniell, Daniell Lab <http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/-danielV
daniell_grants.html> (accessed Nov. 7, 2002). See Ron Southwick, Maya Critics
Prompt Halt of NIH Project, Chron. of Higher Educ. A20 (Dec. 7, 2001) ("[T]he
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups [ICBG] program [is] a consortium of
universities and federal agencies formed to study the environment and develop drug
treatments using natural products. The program is administered by the Fogarty
International Center, the NIH's international arm."). See Nat!. 1nsts. of Health, Insts.,
Fogarty Inti. Ctr. (FIC),
ICBG, <http://www.nih.gov/fic/programslicbg.html#
Introduction> (accessed Dec. 5, 2002).
Dr. Robert Fincher has found that "[m]ost university breeding programs rely on
state or USDA funding ... [and that] industry funding is very small. [Further,]
Federal funding from sources other than USDA is limited." Fincher, supra n. 38.
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The federal government uses the patent system to aid
progress and development. 164 In a general sense, governmentfunded projects focus on broad research that may benefit the
general public, and during periods of economic growth, the
government is more likely to fund basic research, not just
applied research aimed to yield marketable applications of the
research. 165 In contrast, corporation-funded projects focus on
research likely to produce a marketable commodity. 166 Thus,
corporations focus on high-revenue crops like soybeans and
corn, not artichokes and lima beans. 167 However, publicprivate partnerships do occur. Although there have been
"[s]everal positive interactions between academic researchers
and industry," "[i]ntellectual property rights issues remain a
major hurdle in forging a public-private partnership." 168

E. The Influence of the Bayh-Dole Act on Universities
Universities, private corporations and the federal
government often develop technologies (such as plant genetic
discoveries) that have useful and valuable applications in the
other sectors. The research of one entity or group yields

161. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) ("It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use
the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development; ... ; to promote collaboration between commercial
concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions
made by nonprofit organizations [which includes universities, as noted in§ 20 l(i)] and
small business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and
enterprise ... ; to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions
made in the United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the
Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the
needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of
inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area.").
165. Maughan, supra n. 126.
166. For example, the wheat industry sponsors some research at Washington State
University (WSU). Kim Kidwell, a WSU wheat researcher, "select[s] for genes that
reduce risks of production (disease, insect resistance genes) which enhance
environmental safety, and improved the marketability of the crop (milling and baking
quality)." E-mail from Kim Kidwell, Prof. of Crop & Soil Sci., Wash. St. U., to Timothy
P. Daniels (Nov. 27, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels).
167. Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 161. Note, however, that some corporations provide
research grants to professors working on commercially inviable projects, i.e., improving
the yield of a crop not widely consumed. Such grants are arguably provided as a public
relations tool, a humanitarian effort, or both. Maughan, supra n. 126.
168. Natl. Science & Tech. Council, Comm. on Science, Working Group on Plant
Genomes, National Plant Genome Initiative, Progress Report (Dec. 2001),
<http://www .ostp.gov/nstc/htmllmpgi200 1/executive_summary.htm> (accessed Jan. 2,
2003).
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benefits to the others. 169 In 1980, Congress passed the
University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (the
Bayh-Dole Act) in part "to promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities." 170
The Bayh-Dole Act 171 requires universities that receive
federal grant funds to (1) disclose inventions discovered with
federal funds to the federal agency that provided the funds; (2)
elect whether to retain title in the invention discovered with
federal funds; and (3) file for patent protection. If the recipient
university (a.k.a. "nonprofit organization" or "contractor" in the
Act) fails to do these three things within a reasonable time, the
federal agency may take sole title to the invention that was
developed with federal funds. 172

169. 15 U.S.C. § 3701. (current through P.L. No. 107-278 (excluding P.L. No. 107250 to 252, 273)) (Section 1 of Executive Order No. 13185 (66 F.R. 701, Dec. 28, 2000)
states, "The partnership in science and technology that has evolved between the
Federal Government and American universities has yielded benefits that are vital to
each.").
170. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) ("[T]o u..qe the patent system to promote the utilization
of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; ... ; to promote

collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations [including
universities] ... are used in a manner to promote fee competition and enterprise; to
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United
states by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government
and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; ... ") (italics
added).
171. P.L. No. 96-517. 1980 H.R. 6933 (codified at 35 U .S.C. chapters 30 and 38).
172. 35 U .S.C. § 202 (P.L. No. 96-517, 1980 H.R. 6933). Blumenstyk summarizes
the Act this way:
Under the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, universities have the right to own and
commercialize such inventions. But they are also required to inform agencies
of all inventions. That is to preserve the government's right to a royalty-free
use of the invention, and its right to 'march in' and take control of an
invention if it deems that the company selected to commercialize the
invention is acting against the public interest.
Universities Try to Keep Inventions From Going 'Out the Back Door': To Keep Hold of
T~ucrative Dicenses, Institutions Educate, Cajole, and Sometimes Sue, Chron. of Higher
Educ. (May 17, 2002). See Press & Washburn, supra n. 106 ("The goal of the legislation
was to bring ideas out of the ivory tower and into the marketplace, by offering
universities the opportunity to license campus-based inventions to U.S. companies,
earning royalties in return. Both the government and the business world saw
universities not merely as centers of learning and basic research but as sources of
commercially valuable ideas.").
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A report by the Department of Commerce summarized the
Act:
The Bayh-Dole Act created a uniform Federal patent
policy that permits most Federal laboratories to grant
exclusive licenses on Federal patents to United States
businesses and universities. Private firms had been
reluctant to invest substantial time and resources in the
commercialization of a Federally developed technology
under a non-exclusive government license that
competitors could secure as well. The Bayh-Dole Act
eliminated this barrier to innovation. 173
The Bayh-Dole Act caused a great leap in the numbers of
patent applications filed by universities. 174 "This legislation ...
enable[s] universities. . . to own and patent inventions
developed under federally funded research programs. The act
provides an incentive for universities to market their
innovations and for industry to make high-risk investments." 175
The AUTM summarized the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act:
"The rise of biotechnology R&D and, more generally, of
research in the life sciences, since the early 1980s also boosted
the number of research universities with offices of technology
licensing, and increased the incomes earned by these offices." 176
Continuing, the AUTM noted,
During recent decades American research universities
have become increasingly involved in various technology
transfer activities by establishing technology business
incubators, technology parks, venture capital funds for
start-up companies, university research foundations,
and technology licensing offices. This trend toward ...

173. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Tech. Admin., Technology in the National Interest 31
<http://www .ta.doc.gov/Reports/TechNIIchp2e.htm> ( 1996).
174. Purdue U., Common Questions & Answers Abont Technology Transfer,
<http://www. purdue .ed u/UNS/hot. top ics/970313. Tech. Tra nsfer2.h tml> (accessed Nov.
20, 2002) ("Prior to 1980, fewer than 250 patents were issued to U.S. universities each
year and discoveries were often not commercialized for the public's benefit. Today, U.S.
universities participating in a survey by the Association of University Technology
Managers, Inc., (AUTM) are issued an average of almost 1,500 patents per year.
Moreover, there are now more than 200 universities engaged in technology transfer,
eight times more than in 1980, as evidenced by the membership of AUTM.").
175. Jd.
176. Everett M. Rogers, Jing Yin, & Joern Hoffman, Assessing the Effectiveness of
Technology Transfer Offices at U.S. Research Universities, XII J. of the Assoc. of U.
Tech. Managers (2000),
<http://www.autm.net/pubs/journai/OO/Copy%20of"lo20
assessing.html> (accessed Nov. 25, 2002) (internal citation omitted).
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'academic capitalism' is also illustrated by an increase
in the number of university-based research centers, and
by the tendency for some universities to retain partial
ownership in the start-up companies spinning out of
university research. 177
The AUTM went on to explain why some universities find
"academic capitalism" so desirable.
Through this variety of boundary -spanning activities,
research universities seek to facilitate the transfer of
technological innovations to private companies in order
(1) to create jobs and to contribute to local economic
development, and (2) to earn additional funding for
university research. Technology transfer from research
universities has been increasingly recognized as an
engine for economic growth in the United States. This
relatively new role for research universities has been
greeted with considerable discussion and debate. 178
The Bayh-Dole Act was followed by other efforts to facilitate
working relationships between the federal government and
private entities.
In 1986, Congress passed the Federal
Technology Transfer Act (FTTA), which "authorized Federal
agencies to enter into cooperative research and development
agreements (CRADAs) with companies, universities, and nonprofit institutions for the purpose of conducting research of
benefit to both the Federal government and the CRADA
partner." 179
Further, one commenter noted some of the changes
resulting from legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act and
FTTA:
Before [the 1980s], research conducted at universities
and supported by public funds belonged to the public.
But the new laws [e.g., Bayh-Dole, FTTA, and others]
give academic researchers intellectual-property rights;
now they can, for example, patent a gene they discover
or an invention they make, even if the entire enterprise
has been financed by taxpayers through [federal
grants]. 180

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra n. 173, at 32.
Andrews, supra n. 146.
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Another concern raised by passage of the Act is that it gives
incentives to public universities to focus more on the
same type of [research] activities that are being
performed by the private sector thereby undermining
[taxpayers'] ability to get basic and fundamental
research done and into the public domain. 181

F. Universities' Interaction With Foreign Entities
As the globalization trend continues, universities are
having more interaction with foreign entities. 182 Globalization
presents both challenges, such as biopiracy, and opportunities,
such as humanitarian projects in developing countries.
Biopiracy is a hot topic closely related to university plant
genetic research. Some university researchers have run into
resistance from foreign governments when they seek source
material from abroad (i.e., foreign landraces). Occasionally,
foreign governments are reluctant to allow United States
researchers to genetically modifY the foreign plant and obtain a
U.S. patent.l 83
University researchers involved in
humanitarian-related plant research occasionally have
difficulty obtaining plant germplasm from less-developed
countries for use in their research. "This ironically hinders the
ability of humanitarian-oriented crop research projects ... to
assist these nations in both characterizing and improving their
native crop genetic resources." 184 There is great concern
regarding
biopiracy-United
States
corporations
and
universities profiting from germplasm provided by developing
countries without giving any compensation to the source
countries. 185 In contract terms, biopiracy may be considered
unjust enrichment.

181. Smith, supra n. 119 (this e-mail solely from Stephen Smith).
182. See e.g. Outlook, Syngenta Pulls Out of Research Collaboration with IGAU
(Indira Gandhi Agric. U .) <http://www .outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id= 103244>
(accessed Dec. 17, 2002).
183. Kultida Samabuddhi, U.S. Work on Jasmine Rice Causes Worry, Bankok Post
(India),
<http ://scoop. bangkokpost.co. thlbkkpost/200 lloctober200 1/bp200 11 004/news/
04oct2001_news11.html> (accessed Nov. 16, 2002). See Chris Wescott, Thai Jasmine
Rice and the Threat of the US Biotech Industry, Me. Organic Farmers & Gardeners
Assn. <http://www.mofga.org/news20020119.html> (Dec. 8, 2001).
184. E-mail from Eric N. Jellen, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Plant & Animal Sci., B.Y.U.,
to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 14, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels).
185. See Southwick, supra n. 163.
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Universities have a unique niche when it comes to plant
genetic research that focuses on humanitarian or development
applications. Frequently nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have
contacts and grass-roots level personnel located in third-world
countries. Universities often have expertise and research
facilities that NPOs lack.
Thus, universities seeking to
establish humanitarian projects can benefit by partnering with
NPOs already located in the target country. 186
Such partnerships are most valuable when they focus on
small-scale crops like cassava, sweet potatoes, and quinoa,
rather than major food crops like corn and soybeans on which
large corporations focus. 187 Small-scale crops are not big
money makers, yet they can be a vital source of nutrition to
third-world peoples.

G. Possible Future Action by Congress
Congress will probably not amend the general utility patent
to exclude plant patents. If the amicus briefs filed in support of
Pioneer are any indication, the plant biotech industry would
vigorously oppose such an amendment because of its significant
investment. 188
Some people involved in the plant IP and research industry
indicate that the USPTO may need to raise the bar regarding
IP protection for plants. 189 The USPTO may be giving patent
protection too liberally. 190 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics
186. Universities, however, are establishing more global contacts. Eugene B.
Sko1nikoff recently wrote about "the internationalization of higher education": "As
competence in science and technology spreads throughout the world, and as more
subjects must be dealt with on a global scale, all major research universities and many
other higher-education institutions have established a wide variety of international
ties." Protecting University Research Amid National-Security Fears, Chron. of Higher
Educ. BlO (May 10, 2002).
187. Lurquin, supra n. 98, at 161 ("[CJrops such as cassava ... , bananas, the sweet
potato, and oil palm trees are receiving attention thanks to the establishment of
consortia between developing countries' institutions and Western universities. This
cooperation would not have occurred if biotech companies had been involved in only
these applications, because the crops just described are considered to be small crops,
not worth much investment in research and development.").
188. Smith, supra n. 116 (If utility patent coverage of plants were threatened,
"Universities might not scream to the same extent we [corporations] would, because
while their licensing is important to both revenue generation and also to maximum
consumer benefit, the revenue stream is not their life blood (as it is ours).").
189. E-mail from Daniel Fairbanks, Prof., Dept. of Plant and Animal Sci., B.Y.U.,
to Timothy P. Daniels (Oct. 9, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels).
190. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetically Modified Crops: The Eth1:cal and
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expressed concern over the issuance of overly broad patents in
the following statement:
The intent of patent law is that the right to exploit
should be set against the encouragement of further
invention. Excessively broad claims could, because they
can block the route to implementation, act contrary to
this intent .... We take the view that excessively broad
patents will diminish useful research and so diminish
welfare. 191
Consequently,
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics
"recommend[s] that national patent offices ... draw up new
guidelines . . . to discourage the over-generous granting of
patents with broad claims that have become a feature of both
plant and other areas of biotechnology." 19 2
There is some indication, however, that the USPTO has
started to implement some of the suggestions made by the
Nuffield Council. The USPTO may be "becom[ing] more strict
in its handling of applications, especially as regards broad
claims." 193 However, the effects of narrow versus broad claims
continue to be hashed out in the courts. For example, the
United States Supreme Court recently held that
fa] patentee who narrows a claim as a condition for
obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader
subject matter, whether the amendment was made to
avoid the prior art or to comply with § 112. We must
regard the patentee as having conceded an inability to
claim the broader subject matter or at least as having
abandoned his right to appeal a rejection. In either case
estoppel may apply. 194
The law of intellectual property involving plants is in a
state of flux and probably will be for years to come. In fact, this
has been dubbed the "Biotech Century." 19 5
Social Issues ch. 8 "Broad Claims," <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publications/
gmcrops/rep0000000112.asp> (accessed Dec. 16, 2002).
191. ld.
HJ2. ld.
193. E-mail from Janice M. Strachan, Sr. Examiner, Plant Variety Protection Off.,
to Timothy P. Daniels (Dec. 16, 2002) (copy on file with Mr. Daniels) (noting
presentation by patent attorney Robert Jondle (Jondle & Associates, P.C.) at a recent
conference of the American Seed Trade Association).
194. Festa Corp. u. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1840
(2002).
1!J5. Sheila R. Arriola, Biotechnology Patents After Festo: Rethinking the
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CONCLUSION

There are three statutes under which an inventor may
protect their plant genetic research-the general utility patent,
the PP A, and the PVP A The J.E.M. holding resolved an
ambiguity in patent law-whether the PPA and PVPA
preempted using the section 101 utility patent to protect plant
varieties. To seed companies' delight, the Court affirmed
inventors' rights to obtain section 101 protection for plant
varieties. As section 101-protected seeds come to dominate the
seed market, farmers will have no choice but to purchase
patented seed each year, rather than saving seed for
replanting. Besides affecting farmers, the J.E.M. case will
affect-for both good and ill-universities that engage in plant
genetic research.
The benefit of the J.E.M. decision is that universities will
be able to more easily capture the full economic value of their
plant genetic inventions and discoveries. The negative aspect
of this case, however, is that professors and universities will be
hesitant to publish their findings until they have obtained IP
protection or until they believe the discovery is not worth
marketing.
Encouraged by legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act,
universities have become more involved in IP issues since 1980;
after all, what university would not like to supplement its
revenue with royalties from license agreements? However,
there are valid concerns with mission drift as publiclysupported universities become more entangled with corporate
sponsors.
There are some important differences in the ways in which
universities and corporations approach IP issues. Universities
tend to be primarily interested in research for educational
purposes involving the public good, while corporations, of
course, generally have a profit motive.
Also at issue is the propriety of United States entitiescorporations as well as universities-genetically altering and
patenting foreign countries' indigenous plants without
providing just compensation.
Developments in plant
biotechnology present universities with the problematic issue

Heightened Enablemenl and Written Description Requirements, 11 Fed. Cir. B. J. 919,
92:3 (2002) (citing Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century xv ( 1998)).
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of biopiracy and with the opportunity to provide significant
humanitarian service.
The holding of the J.E.M. case may not have been as pivotal
as that of Chakrabarty (namely, living things are
patentable), 196 yet J.E.M. confirmed Chakrabarty's broad,
anything-under-the-sun, 197 interpretation of patent rights
provided by section 101. Universities that engage in plant
research should be aware of the J.E.M. holding. They should
find out whether their source plant materials are patented
under section 101 because they may need to obtain permission
to use that source material for research. If more and more
plant materials receive utility patent protection, universities
may incur new costs as their technology transfer staff will need
to be aware of plant patent issues. However, some, if not all, of
the costs may be offset by licensing revenues if the university
obtains IP protection on its own plant inventions.

Timothy P. Daniels

196. See supra n. 51.
197. See supra n. 21. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Sen. Rep. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. 1923, 82d Cong., 6 (1952) (statement made by P.J.
Frederico, a principle draftsman of the 1952 Act, Hearings on H.R. 3760 before
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37
(195 I) (quoting .Johnson u. Johnson, 60 F. 618, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1894))).

